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Policy support to commercialisation and Europe’s ‘commercialisation gap’ 
 
Abstract 
Despite substantial public funding dedicated to enhance the commercialisation and 
the market uptake of research results (CMU), Europe’s perceived ‘commercialisation 
gap’ vis-à-vis its main competitors has remained substantial. This paper surveys the 
commonalities of successful commercialisation policy instruments, based on case 
studies of five European and four non-European CMU policy measures. Five 
common features are identified: 1) specific policy design; 2) combination of financial 
support and complementary services; 3) the spanning of several stages of the 
innovation cycle; 4) virtuous Matthew effect; 5) policy learning. These commonalities 
ensured that the policy instruments effectively addressed critical weaknesses in 
countries’ innovation systems. 
 
1. Introduction and overview 
 
Scholarly interest in the commercialisation1 and market uptake of research results 
(CMU), a previously relatively underinvestigated component of countries’ overall 
innovation performance recently increased considerably (Grimaldi et al., 2011), partly 
in the context of the wide-held belief in the much-debated ‘European Paradox’ 
(European Commission, 1995). According to the hypothesis advanced by this popular 
term, Europe plays a leading role in science but underperforms in terms of converting 
its top-level scientific output into commercial success and generating innovation-
driven growth.  
As a consequence of heated debates on the European paradox (reviewed in 
Dosi et al., 2006; 2009) the issue of CMU also got to the forefront of policy agenda. 
Over the past 15 years a proliferation of policy measures can be observed. New 
policy instruments support technology transfer and the commercialisation of the 
results of scientific research. Other measures stimulate industry-academia 
collaborations and firms’ external knowledge exploitation. Others again, foster new 
technology-based entrepreneurship. Moreover, spectacular institutional development 
took place: a range of intermediary institutions were established to assist 
stakeholders in their commercialisation efforts. 
Furthermore, legislative and regulatory changes have been adopted to 
improve universities’ commercialisation performance. Emulating – with considerable 
delay – the U.S. 1980 Bayh-Dole Act that granted the ownership right of intellectual 
property (IPR) originating from publicly funded university-based research to 
universities,2 European (and other OECD countries’) governments changed their 
IPR-regulation on academic patenting (Geuna and Rossi, 2011; Mowery and 
Sampat, 2005). Other reform measures tried to integrate capital market-based 
1 Commercialisation refers to formal revenue generation from licensing or sale of intellectual property, 
and/or to the commercial exploitation of university inventions through academic entrepreneurship: 
start-ups and spin-offs. The involvement of private funding in university (or public research 
institution’s) research projects that had previously been funded exclusively publicly, is also considered 
commercialisation. 
2 The Act has effectively changed university culture in the U.S. (referred to by Etzkowitz et al., 2000 as 
the ‘second academic revolution’) and gave rise to the emergence of universities’ third mission: 
entrepreneurship – in addition to education and research. 
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features in European bank-based systems. These latter measures addressed the oft-
mentioned explanatory factor of Europe’s observed innovation- and 
commercialisation gaps: its bank-based system, considered inadequate for seizing 
the opportunities of today’s key enabling technologies (Hirsch-Kreinsen, 2011; 
Martinsson, 2010). Over the past two decades significant convergence took place in 
Europe with respect to the adoption of some Anglo-Saxon specifics in corporate 
financing (Mullineux et al., 2011). 
Despite legislative and regulatory reform and substantial public funding 
dedicated to enhance CMU in Europe, Europe’s perceived ‘commercialisation gap’ 
vis-á-vis its main competitors has remained substantial (IUC, 2011), albeit hard to 
measure (see later).  
Consequently, it is of utmost importance for Europe to improve the 
effectiveness of the design and use of commercialisation policy instruments. Since 
academic papers contain rather general recommendations, such as bottom-up policy 
design, systemic and problem-oriented configuration of policy measures, cost-
effectiveness, competitive allocation of support, the necessity to monitor and evaluate 
the measures and refine policy (Bemelmans-Videc et al., 2011; see also Borrás and 
Edquist, 2013), policy effectiveness can rather be improved by a systematic 
monitoring of peers’ best practices. Despite the limitations of policy emulation in 
different (e.g. economic, social, institutional and cultural) contexts, a comparative 
analysis of countries’ commercialisation policy instruments may contribute to policy 
learning. 
The objective of this paper is to survey and analyse a sample of CMU policy 
measures considered successful, and identify their commonalities. A case study 
based investigation method is applied, covering five European and four non-
European CMU policy measures.  
The rest of the paper is structured in four sections. Section 3 presents the 
research method and the deriving limitations. The analysis of the commonalities of 
the surveyed cases is presented in section 4. Section 5 concludes and summarises 
the general lessons of the cases.  
Before embarking on the analysis, the next section reviews the difficulties of 
quantifying the extent of Europe’s commercialisation gap. 
 
2. Measuring commercialisation performance 
 
Despite a long record of dedicated policy measures countries’ commercialisation 
performance, i.e. the aggregate impact of the CMU policy mix is still hard to measure. 
Few readily available data sources exist (Gulbrandsen and Rasmussen, 2012) and 
the currently applied indicators (e.g. IUC 2011; OECD, 2011) are of limited use, since 
they  
• focus on invention-type outputs, such as PCT patent applications and public-
private co-publications,3 or  
• are concerned with broad, competitiveness-type factors (e.g. knowledge-
intensive services exports; share of innovative SMEs, share of fast growing 
innovative firms), or  
• quantify the ‘explanatory factors of underperformance’: availability of venture 
capital; availability of public support. 
3 Co-publication data proxy stakeholders’ commitment to engage in innovation collaboration, but their 
use to quantify Europe’s CMU gap is not straightforward. 
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Some indicators quantify the intensity of science-industry links, such as ‘percentage 
of firms collaborating with universities’; ‘share of business funded R&D in higher 
education’. These indicators do not reveal much about CMU performance, at least 
not directly: they are rather concerned with collaboration that may, or may not result 
in inventions, that, in turn, may or may not be commercialised.  
Other indicators seem more useful from CMU point of view such as ‘license 
and patent revenues from abroad as percent of GDP’; ‘share of young innovative 
companies within the total corporate population’; ‘number of spin-offs and new 
technology-oriented start-ups’,4 nevertheless they are far from sufficient for a precise 
measurement of comparative CMU-performance.  
Hence, at risk of some exaggeration it can be determined that the consensus 
view of Europe’s CMU-gap (European Commission, 2007) is a perception rather than 
a precisely quantified fact. This perception is based on selected innovation- and 
CMU-indicators, on anecdotal evidence and, more importantly, on the results of 
competitiveness benchmarking exercises. 
 
3. Research methodology and limitations 
 
The case study investigation that constitutes the empirical basis of this paper was 
started in the framework of a research project carried out for the European 
Commission: analysis of CMU policy instruments. The case studies investigated the 
objectives, policy rationales, sectoral orientation, funding modalities and impact of the 
selected measures as well as the evolution of these factors. The author of this paper 
prepared the case studies over the period between March and May 2013. This initial 
stock of evidence was complemented with desk research on five additional policy 
measures (table 1).  
For the selection of the sample the following procedure has been applied. 
Drawing on Erawatch’s inventory5 of innovation support measures, the ones that are 
relevant from the point of view of CMU were first identified. CMU policy measures are 
designed to meet one or several of the following policy objectives: they support 1) 
knowledge transfer and the commercialisation of public research results; 2) public-
private research collaboration; 3) sectoral innovation in manufacturing and the 
commercial applications of the results of applied research; 4) technology transfer and 
innovation collaboration between firms; 5) establishment of innovative start-ups; 6) 
innovative stakeholders’ access to funding and particularly to risk capital; 7) scale-up 
of initial commercialisation results and move from the prototype phase towards 
market uptake (demonstration projects, pilot plants and living labs); 8) diffusion of 
innovative technologies.6 
This method resulted in a sample of altogether 313 measures (in 31 countries: 
EU27, USA, Japan, Korea, and China). The measures selected for case study 
investigation were selected on the basis that they encompass a diversified mixture of 
the above-identified categories and be located in a variety of European and non-
4 These latter data are available only in a couple of countries.  
5 ERAWATCH is the European Commission's information platform on European, national and regional 
research and innovation systems and policies (http://erawatch.jrc.ec.europa.eu). It provides 
information among others on research and innovation policy support measures implemented by 
national governments in 61 countries. 
6 This methodology and the above categories were elaborated by IDEA Consult, the coordinator of the 
research project carried out for the European Commission (coordinator: Vincent Duchene). The 
categories applied originally included two more items: support to IPR-issues, and support to the 
innovative use of standards.  
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European countries. This paper draws exclusively on the case studies prepared by 
the author. 
An important selection criterion was the given measures’ success. Success 
was assessed analysing the evaluation reports of the individual policy measures as 
well as a range of other documents. The policy schemes were considered successful, 
if they 
• contributed to enhancing the technological readiness of a given R&D effort, i.e. 
to moving a given R&D undertaking ahead, along the innovation cycle; or 
• contributed to the implementation of specific commercialisation acts (see 
footnote 1); or  
• enhanced the market uptake or the diffusion of new technology and 
• managed to mobilise their target groups.7  
In order to gain sufficient information for a well-substantiated analysis of the 
individual policy measures, only measures with respect to which abundant 
information was available (such as impact analysis, evaluation reports, success 
stories, academic papers) have been selected in the sample. This can be considered 
a limitation, because non-negligible selection bias applies.  
Other selection criteria were a minimum threshold budget of € 5 million 
annually, and the lack of predetermined end dates of the policy schemes. In addition 
to established schemes going on for more than half a decade, some recently 
introduced policy measures have also been included in the sample. 
 
Table 1 around here 
 
Table 1 makes it clear that the policy objectives related to the individual schemes are 
quite heterogeneous. Most of the programmes try to incorporate several, albeit 
related policy objectives at the same time. Moreover, the measures target multiple 
industries and technologies, and annual budgets are also divergent: while all of them 
exceed the minimum threshold established as selection criterion (€ 5 million), the 
budget of some measures (e.g. KOTEC; A-STEP, SBIR) is by orders of magnitude 
higher than that of other measures. Additionally, the socio-economic and institutional 
contexts which shape the framework conditions of stakeholders’ activities are also 
dissimilar.  
This heterogeneity raises doubts about the generalisation of the results of this 
comparative survey. These limitations notwithstanding, the common features of the 
surveyed cases presented in the next section are thought-provoking and elicit 
substantial policy learning.  
 
4. Common features of the selected cases 
 
4.1 Specific or broad-based policy design? 
 
The first conspicuous commonality of several of the surveyed instruments was that 
policy-makers stipulated well-defined, specific objectives, to be achieved with the 
help of the given measure. The well-formulated, detailed policy objectives suggested 
that policy-makers have a clear concept of 1) what they want to achieve; 2) the ways 
to achieve the objectives and 3) the potential users of the results.  




                                            
Information for policy design was in most of the surveyed cases compiled in a 
bottom-up manner, involving both the representatives of the potential target groups 
and policy designers at various levels of public policy.  
The history of the Japanese ‘Industrial Technology Development Programme’ 
launched by the New Energy and Industrial Technology Development Organization 
(NEDO) exemplifies the bottom-up approach specific policy instruments are 
conceived with.  
Following extensive information collection activities: foresight studies; 
interviews with industry experts on technological trends and industry’s needs; 
consultation with the academia about research endeavours that may fulfil industry 
needs; and about the feasibility and the perspectives of some proposed research 
projects, NEDO’s experts together with ministry (Ministry of Economy Trade and 
Industry) officials and cabinet office representatives identified critical medium-, and 
longer-term research and development issues. They set R&D targets and developed 
programmes that contribute to the achievement of these targets. Planning also 
considered the issue of commercialisation: intellectual property (IP) strategies were 
designed in the planning period. The ‘Industrial Technology Development 
Programme’ was the result of this long planning and programming exercise. The calls 
of this programme contained highly specific objectives, for example technology 
development of next-generation high-efficiency and high-quality lighting; 
development of extremely low-power circuits and systems; shifting from petrol to 
biomass in the chemical industry to reduce petrol consumption; rare metal substitute 
materials development. 
Similarly, before launching the Catapult Centres programme, the UK 
Technology Strategy Board (TSB) invited stakeholders’ views – not only on relevant 
technology areas, but also on management and governance arrangements they 
considered as optimal. Stakeholders were defined in the broadest possible sense, 
involving business and research communities, the public administration, and 
representatives of various innovation supporting organisations. Drawing on 
stakeholders’ inputs gained in a series of consultations and workshops, TSB 
prepared the mid-term strategy of the new centres: how they ought to complement 
existing innovation infrastructure, how their outreach is ensured, how they fill the 
space between ‘concept’ and ‘commercialisation’. TSB identified the key priority 
technological areas in which the new centres should be established. In turn, each 
centre prepared its own strategy and communicated the ways they work with 
business.8  
As a result of these bottom-up policy design exercises, several of the surveyed 
programmes featured highly specific objectives. In addition to the above-detailed 
cases, the Austrian ‘Technologies for Sustainable Development’ programme also 
features very specific objectives such as low-energy and environmentally sustainable 
buildings. Calls for proposals of the U.S. SBIR programme are also structured around 
specific problems that need to be solved. The Finnish Electric Vehicle Systems 
Programme’s objective was the diffusion of electric vehicles through demonstration 
projects and testing platforms. The sub-projects, such as the ‘development of electric 
snowmobile’; ‘electric vehicle charging infrastructure for urban environment’; ‘eBus: 
Testbed for Development’; ‘eStorage – battery systems’, were communicated in a 
systematic manner: they identified the need that requires R&D (what policy intends to 
8 Catapult Centres undertake among others, contract research for business enterprises and participate 
in collaborative applied research projects through ensuring access to capital equipment and high-cost 
research and development infrastructure. 
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achieve); the solution (the funded research projects and the supported demonstration 
programmes), and the expected benefits together with the potential users of the 
results.  
Nevertheless broadly formulated programmes cannot be automatically labelled 
as ones without any strategic vision. As stated in a Swedish Innovation Agency 
publication (Elg and Håkansson, 2012), open calls breed creativity and lead to the 
emergence of ideas with the help of which new priorities can be formulated. It is 
important that policy-makers and supporting organisations do not get stuck in existing 
paradigms, or do not serve only the existing needs of industry; and do not fund only 
the continuation and enhancement of existing research directions. Programmes need 
to be formulated in a way to serve as agents of change, and foster renewal through 
addressing new areas of knowledge. Hence, part of the STI budget needs to be 
earmarked for broadly formulated ‘support of new research directions’.  
In this vein, the Irish portfolio of commercialisation policy measures 
exemplifies the other extreme compared to the Finnish or Japanese ones: it contains 
practically only broadly formulated, general policy measures, such as the 
‘Commercialisation Fund’, the ‘Applied Research Enhancement Programme’; the 
‘Technology Gateway Programme’, the ‘Industry-Led Research Networks 
Programme’; and the ‘Innovation Partnership Programme’. The satisfactory results of 
these programmes9 demonstrate that success can be achieved even without 
meticulously and precisely specified policy objectives. Nevertheless, the fact that Irish 
STI policy advisors recently made recommendations about the necessity of 
prioritisation of public investment in STI and identified priority research areas (RPSG, 
2011), predicts that the Irish policy design will also gradually embrace increasingly 
specific policy measures. 
 
 
4.2 Complementary services 
 
A common feature of the surveyed policy measures was that the financial support 
provided in the framework of most of the surveyed programmes was allocated 
together with complementary services. In this way, the surveyed CMU policy 
instruments have not only fostered narrowly defined CMU-specific activities, but have 
also contributed to the accumulation of complementary assets, indispensable for 
capturing value.10 Complementary services have, in a way, accompanied the 
recipients of the given programmes’ core support to further stages in the business 
development cycle. 
The Korean loan guarantee programme, for example, is accompanied by 
technology appraisal, venture certification, consultancy services and mediation of 
technology agreements and technology transfers. Among these complementary 
services, technology appraisal and certification proved highly valuable for an 
increasing number of stakeholders in the Korean innovation system. The Korean 
Finance and Technology Corporation’s (KOTEC) technology appraisal is carried out 
with the help of a non-financial appraisal model that combines technology valuation 
and business feasibility / business potential valuation. KOTEC’s methodology of 
assessing the value of individual indicators, and calculating the summary technology 
9 See e.g. annual reports of Enterprise Ireland; Forfás, Science Foundation Ireland. 
10 Recall Teece’s (1986) classical argument, that the ownership of complementary assets will 
determine who captures value from innovations. 
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rating grade (the weighting of these indicators) is protected by patent. The indicators 
considered include 
• the technological ability of the applicant, i.e. his/its technology management 
ability and R&D ability;  
• the value of the technology, (technological superiority, or ‘degree of 
technological extension’);  
• marketability and the potential size of the market;  
• business prospects;  
• profit prospects;  
• the related risks.  
 
The novelty and the value added of KOTEC’s appraisal system lie in the fact that the 
usual problem impeding commercialisation: that individual stakeholders have a good 
understanding of either the technology or of the business potential – is present also 
in support organisations and in financial institutions. A reliable certificate of the 
potential value of the technology and of its business feasibility / business potential is 
therefore extremely valuable: it reduces the common information asymmetries that 
are otherwise the main barriers of new technology-oriented business development. It 
is by no surprise that KOTEC’s appraisal has been extensively used by public R&D 
support organisations for selecting the recipients of various innovation-, SME-, and 
commercialisation support schemes. Appraisal is provided also as a service that 
precedes companies' listing on KOSDAQ market. 
Beneficiaries of CMU programmes in other countries could also benefit from 
various complementary services, such as business consultancy, coaching and 
capability building for efficient innovation management, or consultancy on IPR issues, 
support to the identification of suitable business partners. The experts of the public 
innovation intermediaries, e.g. Enterprise Ireland; Tekes, Finland; Design Council, 
UK; Austrian Research Promotion Agency, Japan Science and Technology Agency, 
evaluated the commercial potential of the scientific results and helped grantees to 
elaborate IPR and commercialisation strategies. Experts and grantees jointly decided 
about the adequate commercialisation channel (licensing, or start-up formation, 
contract research). Once this latter decision had been taken, innovation agencies 
offered channel-specific services: if start-up formation was the decided 
commercialisation mode, academic entrepreneurs were offered consultancy services 
with respect to the design of the business plan. The agencies assisted beneficiaries 
also by building and mediating linkages to third party funding providers.  
If contract research or collaboration with industry was the chosen 
commercialisation channel, the experts of the public intermediary organizations 
provided linkage building services to detect potential industrial partners: they 
organised business meetings and university technology exhibitions. 
In summary, complementary services aimed at embedding innovative 
stakeholders into the national/regional innovation system, or enhancing awardees’ 
system embeddedness. 
 
4.3 Spanning several stages of the innovation cycle 
 
A noticeable commonality of the surveyed cases was that they span several stages in 
the innovation cycle. Although the surveyed policy measures were all targeting CMU, 
the case study investigations revealed that recipients’ R&D activity, more specifically, 
translational research was also supported. Support was provided both to the initial 
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stage of the commercialisation process: proof-of-concept; implementation of 
prototypes, or test devices; pre-clinical drug trials; and to later stages: commercial 
application (actual commercial product, actual device, clinical trial).  
The recognition that commercialisation necessitates further research and 
development efforts underlines the well-known thesis of innovation economics that 
R&D is not a separate stage that precedes commercialisation: the two stages are 
deeply intertwined in the innovation process through multiple feedback loops (Kline 
and Rosenberg, 1986).  
In this vein, it can be established that the valley of death between research 
and commercial application is not one single valley, rather a series of valleys. 
Outputs in one stage of the innovation cycle (e.g. IP, prototype, new product, new 
venture, spin-off company) immediately trigger demand for new types of support that 
facilitate activities in the subsequent stage of the cycle.  
By designing policy measures that span several stages of the innovation cycle 
or by systematically combining multiple policy measures that address subsequent 
stages of the cycle, the bureaucratic procedure of support allocation can be 
shortened. Consequently, the time-to-market requirement of new product 
development – a critical factor for commercialisation success – is not jeopardised by 
long bidding procedures. 
The primary example of stage-spanning measures is the U.S. SBIR 
programme, where participation is organised in ‘phases’ and only Phase I awardees 
are entitled to apply for Phase II funding. Accordingly, only if the technical merit, 
feasibility and commercial potential of the proposed R&D effort is validated (this is 
what funding can be applied for) can applicants submit proposals for Phase II 
funding. In this (later) stage of the commercialisation process, funding targets 
demonstration activities such as testing, prototype, scale-up studies, design, 
performance verification of test products ( Audretsch and Aldridge, 2014).  
Emulating the successful U.S. practice of early-stage financing through 
government procurement several countries have introduced similar schemes, 
including Korea (KOSBIR), the UK (Small Business Research Initiative), and even 
Europe’s Horizon 2020 includes a new SME instrument, building on the SBIR model 
(Audretsch and Aldridge, 2014). 
The Japanese A-Step programme is another example of stage-spanning 
programmes. At the IPR stage of the university invention, for example, support is 
provided to the preparation of a feasibility study: the experts of the programme’s 
funding and administering body (Japan Science and Technology Agency) evaluate 
the practical applicability of the given basic research output. They validate whether 
the research undertaking in question has a technology transfer potential and whether 
the research output meets potential collaborating companies’ needs. Another audit 
investigates, whether a university spin-off company would be a good channel of 
commercialisation. At a later stage, the programme supports applied R&D carried out 
in science–industry collaboration. Once applied R&D bears fruit (prototype stage), 
R&D activities that aim to test the new product may obtain support. Finally, if the 
chosen commercialisation channel is university-based start-up venture formation, 
support can be obtained to cover the costs of the first commercial activities.  
In the UK, two policy measures are formally combined to span multiple stages 
in the innovation cycle. The Catapult Centres Programme focuses on the translation 
of research into products and services (technology transfer stage) through science-
industry collaboration in technology and innovation centres. The Design Leadership 
Programme offers businesses and university scientists a package of support and 
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coaching with the help of which companies can boost the sales of their new, 
innovative products and enter new markets. The latter policy measure focuses on 
one of the last stages in the innovation cycle, in which technological innovation and 
design for innovation are combined to maximise IP value and improve the 
marketability of new products.  
Recognising that design is a cross-cutting theme within general innovation and 
CMU strategies, the concept has been formally integrated within the role and mission 
of the Catapults. In the framework of the Design Leadership Programme, the experts 
(associates) of the UK Design Council collaborate with individual Catapult Centres to 
address particular challenges (e.g. with respect to product branding, product and 
packaging design) in the commercialisation process of the products and technologies 
developed within the centres. 
 
4.4 Virtuous Matthew effect 
 
A recurring element in the impact evaluations of the surveyed policy measures was 
that support recipients became later eligible for other types of support. Support 
recipients actively participated in further rounds of the given scheme and/or in related 
regional, national or supra-national programmes.  
The phenomenon of repeated funding of the same recipient is related to the 
debates on the so-called Matthew effect (Merton, 1968) of public subsidy allocation, 
namely that initial advantage (in our case: public subsidy allocation to support 
specific firms’ R&D activities) begets further advantage: there is an observed 
persistence in the allocation of support to past recipients (Antonelli and Crespi, 
2013).  
The latter authors emphasise that this persistence is not always the result of 
information asymmetries that make funding agencies’ grant provision become based 
on the reputation of applicants rather than on the merit of the given proposal. The 
authors make a case for a ‘virtuous Matthew effect’, in which repeated subsidy 
allocation is a condition of success. The virtuous Matthew effect denotes the 
knowledge and competence accumulation of past recipients, who in fact necessitate 
repeated support so that their initial developments attain an elevated stage of 
technology readiness or surpass the prototype phase and be scaled up. 
The recognition of the virtuous Matthew effect has been incorporated into the 
design of some of the surveyed policy measures, by making the support gained in 
previous rounds/phases of the scheme a criterion of support allocation. 
For example, the Austrian ‘Technologies for Sustainable Development’ 
programme’s calls emphasised the cumulative nature of the programme. If a 
submitted proposal intends to build on the results of past projects carried out in the 
framework of previous rounds, and elaborate on them – this is considered an asset. 
The Japanese A-STEP programme – that supports industry-academia collaboration – 
is characterised by stage-based contingent funding: support recipients of the 
‘feasibility study stage’ may later qualify for additional, larger-scale support in the so-
called ‘full R&D stage’. A-STEP’s programme design emulates thereby the highly 
successful U.S. SBIR programme, where Phase 1 awardees (who got support for 
proof of concept) could qualify for Phase 2 (full R&D) support. Later, in Phase 3 
(commercialisation) the same recipients may get support from other agencies 
(Audretsch, 2003). 
 




The surveyed policy instruments – even the relatively new, emerging ones – have all 
been evolving for longer or shorter periods.  
Policy learning and the occasional rearrangement of the programmes were 
notable commonalities of the surveyed successful cases. They were characterised by 
the dialectics of continuity and change.  
The evolution of the instruments was the result of repeated monitoring; policy 
and project evaluation exercises, and expert advice that considered 1) what worked 
and what did not; 2) changes in target groups’ environment; 3) changes in policy 
priorities and 4) emerging new priorities. Following the feedbacks, decision-makers 
kept refining their selection and evaluation methods, got better acquainted with target 
group characteristics, as well as with the in-built bottlenecks of the given policy 
instruments. In an effort to unblock or mitigate the newly identified bottlenecks they 
kept diversifying their portfolio of complementary services, or adapted the measures 
themselves to overcome the barriers that had been discovered during the policy 
implementation process. Over time this resulted in significantly improved policy 
delivery. 
Two analogies come to observers’ mind. Firstly, that similarly to path breaking 
innovations, effective policy instruments are not ‘born fully armed’ either (like Pallas 
Athena): it takes time they develop (through feedbacks, learning and policy 
refinement) to become a success story. Secondly, Hausmann and Rodrik’s (2003) 
remarks, applied originally to economic development, can be paraphrased with 
respect to successful policy measures: STI and CMU policy development is a 
process of self-discovery. 
 
5. Conclusions and lessons  
 
This paper argued that in the context of idea-based growth (Jones, 2005), countries 
are exploring new ways to support the translation of new ideas into technological and 
economically viable innovations. The impact of newly introduced policy measures 
may however be inferior to expectations, which necessitates a continuous monitoring 
of peers’ best practices.  
Analysing and comparing selected support programmes within and outside 
Europe that aim to foster the commercialisation and the market uptake of research 
results this paper tried to deepen our understanding on factors that account for the 
success of CMU policy instruments. 
A general lesson of the surveyed cases is that successful policy schemes are 
not restricted to simple subsidy provision. Policy instruments can better fulfil the 
related policy objectives if they combine core financial support and complementary 
services.  
The selected policy measures proved successful according to the 
predetermined success criteria (contribution to recipients’ progress along the 
innovation cycle; implementation of specific commercialisation acts; enhanced 
diffusion of new technology; mobilisation of target groups) because above and 
beyond improving innovative stakeholders’ access to innovation financing, they 
addressed several critical weaknesses of the innovation systems – in combination 
with other components of the given countries’ policy mixes. Specific policy design, as 
well as official validation (as in the case of KOTEC and A-STEP) reduced information 
asymmetries in the market for technology and improved the framework conditions of 
both innovation collaboration and stakeholders’ investment in commercialisation.  
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The combination of financial support with the provision of soft resources 
contributed to enhancing innovative stakeholders’ system embeddedness and 
network capital. Moreover, this common feature of the surveyed successful policy 
measures effectively ameliorated recipients’ managerial competencies that often 
proved insufficient for leveraging the newly developed technologies.  
The attribute of the surveyed measures that they span several stages of the 
innovation cycle mitigated some systemic deficiencies that inhibited private 
investment in research; public-private collaboration; the scaling-up of initial 
commercialisation results and the diffusion of new technology. 
An important lesson of the fifth common feature is that policy development 
necessitates evolutionary thinking. Policy instruments become successful in an 
interactive learning process involving all stakeholders. Evolutionary policy design 
should allow for policy experimentation and subsequent changes in the programme 
configuration: in terms of the actors addressed; the activities supported; the type of 
support allocated; and the merit review criteria applied during the selection and the 
evaluation processes. 
Finally, the survey of the individual measures and the evolution thereof recalls 
a classical reference work discussing the factors behind the East Asian Miracle 
(World Bank, 1993). According to the referred study, one explanatory factor of the 
East Asian success was the competence of these countries’ high-quality 
bureaucracies that conceived, administered and managed the states’ intervention 
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Table 1: Short description of the surveyed measures 
 







Technologies for Sustainable 
Development 
Austrian Research 
Promotion Agency, Austria 
3,7,8 




A-STEP: Adaptable and Seamless 
Technology Transfer Program 
through Target-Driven R&D  
 
Japan Science and 
Technology Agency, Japan 
1,2,4,5 




Industrial Technology Development 
Programme 
 
















Electric Vehicle Systems 
Programme 
Tekes, Finland 2,3,7,8 
(2011 – ) 
SPD, F+S; 
I_Cycle; 
vM, PL  
Commercialisation Fund Enterprise Ireland, Ireland 1,2,5,7  




Catapult Centres Technology Strategy 
Board, UK 
1,2,5,7 




Design Leadership Programme Design Council, UK 3,8 
(2007 – ) 
SPD; F+Sa; 
PL 











* see the list of categories in the second paragraph of section 3. 
SPD = specific policy design; F+S = provision of both financial support and 
complementary soft resources and services; I_Cycle = the scheme spans several 
stages of the innovation cycle; vM = the scheme allows for virtuous Matthew effect; 
PL = policy learning: the current scheme is the result of gradual policy development: 
it has undergone a series of incremental improvements. 
a = requires recipients’ co-funding 
b = in partnership with other organisations 
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